Visual development

Patterns

The records, questions, and recurring patterns behind Austin's $1 billion gas-plant vote, presented in our documentary teaser deck.

Opening slide: Austin approved a one-billion-dollar power plant behind closed doors. The documentary draws on council records, utility filings, and on-the-record testimony.
1 / 13Austin approved a $1 billion power plant behind closed doors.

Concept visuals for development only — not final film footage.

The Evidence

What the record actually shows

Months of closed-session records, financial filings, staffing records, and public-health research keep surfacing the same handful of patterns. This page states them plainly, with sources. The goal isn't to prove anyone acted in bad faith — it's to show, fairly and specifically, how a billion-dollar, multi-decade decision actually got made.

“Austin chose a $1 billion fossil fuel bet, in secret, when cheaper and cleaner options were already sitting on the table.”
01

A staffing and expertise gap, right when it mattered

Michael Enger, Austin Energy's VP of Market Operations and Resource Planning, personally made the transmission-bottleneck case that later justified the new peaker, on the record in 2023 and 2024. But his role was confirmed vacant and under active outside search — a formal 13-page recruitment profile — around the same window this deal moved through, and he does not appear in the May 11, 2026 Electric Utility Commission meeting that took up the peaker item directly.

That doesn't prove anyone was sidelined. It does show that the seat built to own this exact question sat empty, or in transition, at the moment the question got answered.

02

A process that kept landing outside the rooms built for scrutiny

This item reached closed executive session on its third attempt, after two earlier tries in open session, filed under a “competitive matters” designation. The Electric Utility Commission's own May 11, 2026 meeting flagged a financial-model request the vote seems to have skipped. The 2035 carbon-free goal's own wording had already changed, quietly, to “carbon-free as a percentage of load” (Pattern 07). A separate, unrelated item — the “Dog's Head” land vote — moved through the same night with similarly little public notice.

None of this is disqualifying on its own. Together, it describes a pattern of consequential decisions drifting toward the venues with the least sunlight, not the most.

Oct 23, 2025 — first attempt

A closed-session item on Austin Energy generation resources is placed on the agenda, then withdrawn before any vote.

Source: Council minutes, Item 67
Dec 11, 2025 — second attempt

“We are very concerned about the conversation that took place in November about rushing to put a deposit on gas peakers... None of this has been done,” Kaiba White of Public Citizen tells council, quoting its own December 2024 promise back to it. Withdrawn again, the same day.

Source: Council transcript, Dec 11, 2025
May 21, 2026 — third attempt, and the vote itself

Item 7, the public hearing on the peaker, is pulled from the consent agenda for its own separate hearing — which never happens. Final disposition: “Withdrawn. No motion. No second. No discussion. No vote.” The same afternoon, Item 82 — a closed session citing “competitive matters” — is “conducted and approved,” with no recorded return to open session.

Source: Austin City Council agenda & minutes, May 21, 2026 →
03

Alternatives that weren't run down as far as the city had promised

The December 2024 amendment that set this whole process in motion committed Austin to fully exploring alternatives — batteries, demand response, transmission upgrades, local generation, efficiency — before committing to new gas. But the modeling underpinning the final case was roughly two and a half years old by the time of the vote, and a complete estimate for a gas-free path already existed in the record without becoming the chosen path.

A side-by-side with how at least one other utility (Minnesota's Xcel) structured a comparable decision suggests the range of options actually weighed here may have been narrower than residents were told to expect.

The promise, in the utility's own committed language

“...should Austin Energy seek Council approval for any peaker units, we will show any analysis performed demonstrating why a carbon-free alternative was not available and how the requested action will impact the utility's ability to reach the goal of 100% carbon-free by 2035.” — Ryan Alter amendment, approved 11-0

Source: Council minutes, Dec 12, 2024
The model vs. what actually got signed

New gas capacity: modeled at $1,000–$1,100/kW in Nov 2023; a pre-vote press estimate put the ~400MW deal approved in May 2026 at roughly $2,500/kW (~$1 billion) — more than double the model, and above the 2026 industry benchmark of $1,100–$1,650/kW. The final signed contract price has not been made public. Battery storage: modeled around $70–$111/kW-yr equivalent; Austin Energy's actual signed contracts (OCI Energy, Jupiter Power) land at $80–$82.50/kW-yr — close to on target and independently verifiable, unlike the gas figure.

Source: AE Resource Generation Plan Update (Nov 2023); Lazard LCOE+ 2026; pre-vote press estimate for the gas figure — battery figures from signed contracts →
“Explore,” while the rest of Texas built

Texas's utility-scale battery fleet grew from roughly 780MW (end of 2021) to 3,416MW (end of 2023). Austin Energy's own September 2023 briefing to its oversight commission describes battery storage only in exploratory terms — “explore a solar battery storage program” — with no grid-scale project of its own yet in motion. Its first grid-scale battery contracts weren't signed until 2025 and 2026.

Source: Texas Comptroller; Austin Energy briefing, Sept 2023
Even Austin Energy's own risk modeling favored batteries

Austin Energy's own extreme-event risk briefing models winter-stress financial exposure at $583M with new peakers versus $561M with batteries instead — batteries came out slightly ahead in the utility's own numbers.

Source: AE Resource, Generation and Climate Protection Plan risk briefing
04

A financial pattern: deals that don't hold up over time

This is the clearest, most quantifiable thread. Austin Energy's 2008 biomass contract — 20 years, $2.3 billion — had to be bought out for $460 million once cheap gas made it uncompetitive, and the plant sat idle during Winter Storm Uri itself. The Webberville solar deal locked in a rate, in 2009, of roughly 16.5 cents per kilowatt-hour — several times what utility-scale solar costs today. The 1974 Fayette coal-plant agreement leaves Austin contractually unable to unilaterally reduce its share or exit, regardless of cost. And the new peaker's own payback math shows a likely annual shortfall once its real operating constraints are taken into account.

Four different decades, four different technologies, the same shape: a long-duration commitment sized to the market's assumptions at signing, with no real exit built in when those assumptions stopped holding.

Modeling built for this film — using real Texas grid price data from 2023 through 2026 and Austin Energy's own published cost figures — shows a battery bought or leased on comparable terms would have lost money in nearly every year modeled, with 2023 the one exception. And the new peaker's own projected revenue isn't spread evenly across the year either — it's concentrated in the same small number of highest-price hours batteries are best at capturing. The peaker and any batteries Austin adds later aren't separate bets; they're competing for the exact same rare hours of value.

A shrinking credit for the thing that's supposed to compete

Austin Energy's own numbers show its grid-balancing credit for batteries falling from about a penny per kilowatt-hour in 2021 to roughly a twentieth of a penny by 2024.

Source: Secret Vote financial modeling, AE published cost data
05

Health and equity costs concentrated on one part of the city

Every one of Austin Energy's ten existing peaker units sits in East Austin; the Decker Creek site alone serves a population that's 85% low-income and 41% people of color — the same neighborhoods advocates have been naming for years, before this specific deal existed. National, peer-reviewed science (a 2021 Harvard study, a 2019 PNAS study) establishes, without qualification, that gas-plant emissions cause real and measurable harm at scale, and that peaker plants specifically run dirtier than the baseload plants most of that research measures.

What doesn't yet exist is a study proving that harm to the specific people living nearest Austin's specific plants — a real gap, and one this film names rather than papers over.

Who wasn't in the room

The official minutes for the May 21, 2026 meeting record Council Member Natasha Harper-Madison, District 1 — whose district has hosted every one of Austin Energy's existing peaker units — as absent for the entire meeting. Council Member Vanessa Fuentes, District 2, also includes East Austin peaker sites, and was absent as well.

Source: Austin City Council minutes, May 21, 2026 →
Named, after the fact

A week after the closed-door approval, Council Member José Velásquez's resolution explicitly invokes “Austin's Eastern Crescent,” which has “disproportionately shouldered the impacts” for “the past 100 years,” and requires that new peaker sites not be “solely sited east of I-35.”

Source: KUT, May 29, 2026 →
06

A record of calling itself first, years after it wasn't

Austin Energy markets several of its own programs — a battery-backed “virtual power plant,” a solar feed-in tariff, grid-enhancing transmission software, an enhanced-geothermal pilot — using words like “innovative” and “leading.” Lined up against whichever utility actually did each one first, the pattern is consistent: years behind, in one case more than a decade, and in two cases (vehicle-to-grid, grid-enhancing technologies) no program at all.

None of these technologies is a failure on its own — utilities adopt new things on different timelines for real reasons. But six programs, one direction, and the same “innovative”/“leading” language attached to most of them, is itself a pattern worth naming. A companion page, “The Innovation Gap,” lays out the full comparison, thread by thread, with sources.

Home batteries / virtual power plant — 11 years behind

Green Mountain Power (VT) partnered with Tesla on home batteries in 2015 and had roughly 40MW across 2,500 homes by 2023. Austin Energy's own battery pilot — capped at 1,500 systems — didn't launch until March 2026, calling itself “innovative” in its own press release.

Source: Utility Dive, 2023; Austin Energy news release, Mar 24, 2026 →
Solar feed-in tariff — 15 years behind

Gainesville Regional Utilities (FL) ran the first U.S. utility feed-in tariff from 2009 to 2014, retiring it before Austin Energy's own Solar Standard Offer went live in December 2024. Los Angeles's still-running version has since grown to 450MW.

Source: Harvard Kennedy School Case Program; Pivot Energy; Austin Chronicle, Dec 2024 →
Vehicle-to-grid — no program at all

Utilities in at least half a dozen states — Dominion (VA), Con Edison (NY), National Grid (MA), Pepco (MD) among them — have run electric-school-bus vehicle-to-grid programs since as early as 2018. By August 2026, industry tracking put the count far higher: more than 30 utilities across 21 states (Renewable Energy World / Advanced Energy United, “Factor This Policycast,” Aug 27, 2026 — renewableenergyworld.com/electric-vehicle/ev-charging/supporting-the-grid-with-managed-ev-charging-and-v2g-technology-factor-this-policycast/). Austin Energy has none, and Austin's own transit agency scaled back its electric-bus rollout in 2023–24 after range and reliability problems.

Source: PJM Inside Lines; T&D World; World Resources Institute, 2025; Renewable Energy World/Advanced Energy United, Aug 2026 →
Grid-enhancing technologies — no program at all

Belgium's Elia proved dynamic line rating — software that reads a power line's real-time capacity instead of a fixed worst-case number — in 2008. A fellow Texas utility, Oncor, proved it on the ERCOT grid in 2013. Austin Energy's current $500 million, five-year transmission plan is entirely physical construction; none of its planning documents mention the technology.

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Oncor DLR Case Study, 2014; Austin Energy EUC transmission briefing, Apr 2026 →
Solar interconnection speed — no published timeline

CPS Energy, a comparably sized Texas municipal utility, publishes a 10–20 business day interconnection review commitment. Austin Energy publishes none — and the city's own permit data show its actual median time for a commercial solar project to pass final inspection reached 414 days in 2023, more than six times CPS's stated window.

Source: CPS Energy Commercial Solar Interconnection Process guide, 2026; City of Austin permit records, pulled May 2026 →
Enhanced geothermal — announced, missed, still not built

Austin Energy announced a 5-megawatt enhanced-geothermal pilot in December 2024, calling the technology a “potential game changer” and targeting production by 2025. As of the most recent public tracking (February 2026) it remains pre-construction, with no explanation offered — while its own contractor, Exceed GeoEnergy, moved ahead on a project more than 20 times the size in Presidio, Texas.

Source: Austin Energy news release, Dec 2024; Global Energy Monitor tracker; PMDD/Exceed GeoEnergy, May 2025 →
07

Commitments that got redefined, not kept

Austin Energy's public commitments didn't get reversed outright — the wording around them changed instead, in ways that made them easier to satisfy. The 2035 clean-energy target picked up a qualifying phrase between its original 2020 adoption and the version still in use at the 2026 peaker vote. Separately, the pace of rate increases the utility told the public to expect roughly doubled.

Neither change happened in secret — both are visible in the public record, in ordinances and plan documents anyone can read. That's the point: the goalposts didn't move in the dark, they moved in plain sight, in language most residents wouldn't have reason to reread closely enough to notice.

The emissions goal, reworded

Austin Energy's Council-adopted goal was “100% carbon-free by 2035” (Mar 26, 2020, 9–0). When Council recommitted to it Dec 12, 2024 (11–0), the operative language had become “carbon-free as a percentage of load” — still the metric Austin Energy reported at the May 11, 2026 Electric Utility Commission briefing on the peaker vote itself.

Source: Austin Energy Resource, Generation and Climate Protection Plan, Mar 26, 2020 and Dec 12, 2024; May 11, 2026 EUC briefing
The rate goal, more than doubled

Austin Energy's own 2023 goal, approved in its FY24 budget, was to hold base rate increases to 2% a year. The ordinance Council adopted Aug 13, 2025 (10–1), as part of the FY26 budget, instead set the base rate to rise 5% annually through FY30.

Source: City of Austin FY 2026–2030 Five-Year Financial Forecast Report, p.15, Apr 8, 2025; Ordinance No. 20250813-005, Aug 13, 2025
08

A status the state won't let settle

This isn't only a 2015-and-2026 story. Since 1999 — when the law that deregulated Texas electricity carved out municipal utilities like Austin Energy in the first place — the state has moved to narrow or eliminate that exemption in at least three more legislative rounds: 2015, three separate bills in a single 2023 session, and now 2026, each attempt getting further than the last. None has succeeded yet. But a utility that has to treat its own legal existence as a live question at every legislative session plans capital, sets rates, and staffs long-term planning differently than one that doesn't — that instability is a real cost, whether or not any single bill passes.

The bills themselves are argued in terms of rates, competition, and governance, not climate. But the interests lined up behind the current push track the state's two dominant private power companies, alongside a fossil-fuel-funded advocacy group that was calling Austin's climate policy a “government power grab” years before any of these bills existed. That's a pattern worth naming plainly — not a settled conclusion about any one bill's authorship.

The exemption itself was a deal, not an oversight

When SB7 deregulated Texas electricity in 1999, it carved out municipal utilities and co-ops — secured when Sen. David Sibley met individually with municipal and co-op representatives over the Christmas 1998–99 break, before the bill's public unveiling, to lock in their neutrality and build the coalition needed to pass deregulation for investor-owned utilities.

Source: KUT, “Here's How Texas Lawmakers (And Enron) Shaped The State's Electrical Market,” Jul 23, 2021 →
2015 — died without a floor vote

SB 1945 (Sen. Troy Fraser) would have let heavy-usage customers petition the PUC for rate review, with the state able to push Austin Energy toward deregulated-market pricing if it found the utility's rates not “just and reasonable.” Mayor Steve Adler called it “devastating.” The bill passed committee 6–1 and was placed on the Senate's intent calendar — then died there on April 22, 2015, without reaching a floor vote.

Source: Austin Monitor, Apr 2015; Texas Legislature Online, SB 1945 (84R) bill history →
2023 — three bills, one session, the closest yet

The same legislative session brought three separate bills: Rep. Ellen Troxclair's HB 4211 would have replaced Council oversight of Austin Energy with an appointed board (died in House committee); Sen. Charles Schwertner's SB 1110 would have barred Austin Energy profits from funding city parks, libraries, and public safety; and Sen. Kelly Hancock's SB 853, a narrower rate-review petition mechanism, passed the full Senate 19–11, cleared its House committee, and reached the House calendar before dying without a floor vote — the furthest any of these attempts has gotten.

Source: KUT, “Lawmakers again target Austin Energy,” Apr 4, 2023; LegiScan bill histories, HB 4211 and SB 853 (88R) →
2026 — disband, not just deregulate

Gov. Greg Abbott's Aug 3, 2026 proposal goes further than any prior attempt: full dissolution of Austin Energy's and CPS Energy's municipal-utility status, framed around an estimated 10% bill savings. Austin and San Antonio officials counter that Austin Energy alone transferred roughly $125 million into the city's general fund in 2025, and put the transition cost above $1 billion. Notably, this is the first of these attempts to name CPS Energy alongside Austin Energy — the 2015 and 2023 efforts targeted Austin specifically.

Source: Texas Tribune, “Disbanding city-owned utilities won't lower costs, officials say,” Sept 8, 2026 →
The real precedent: market risk, not maintenance risk

The 2026 proposal is framed around bill savings, but Texas's clearest precedent for what this kind of exposure actually costs isn't about deferred maintenance — it's about pricing. Griddy, a retail provider that passed ERCOT's wholesale price straight through to customers with no buffer, watched the state's $9,000-per-megawatt-hour emergency price cap run for 32 hours instead of the planned one during Winter Storm Uri; roughly 29,000 of its customers were collectively billed $29 million, some over $15,000 apiece, and the company was in bankruptcy within weeks. That exposure wasn't confined to deregulated retailers, either: CPS Energy — a municipally owned utility like Austin Energy — spent roughly $850 million on storm fuel in 2021 and is still in court over it; a state judge ordered it in July 2026 to pay nearly $400 million more to a gas supplier over contracts from that same storm. Neither case turned on who maintained a plant — the exposure came from ERCOT's wholesale market structure itself, which a municipal utility that loses its rate-setting insulation could face just as sharply as a deregulated retailer does.

Source: Texas Tribune, “Griddy's bankruptcy could mean customers don't have to pay large bills,” Mar 16, 2021; San Antonio Report, “Judge rules against CPS Energy in $400M 2021 winter storm gas contract dispute,” Jul 2026 →
Who stands to gain, reportedly

Vistra and NRG — the two private companies that together control more than 70% of Texas's competitive retail electricity market — are named by opponents of the 2026 proposal as its most direct financial beneficiaries if Austin and San Antonio open to retail competition. The Texas chapter of the Sierra Club reports Vistra's PAC gave Gov. Abbott's campaign $75,000 and NRG's PAC gave $25,000; those figures come from an advocacy group opposing the plan and haven't yet been independently checked against Texas Ethics Commission filings for this film.

Source: Sierra Club Texas, “Governor Abbott's Public Power Scheme,” Aug 2026 — dollar figures not independently re-verified →
The ideological case against Austin, on the record since 2019

Texas Public Policy Foundation — funded in part by Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and the Koch network, with oil-and-gas industry ties on a majority of its board — called Austin's climate policy a “government power grab” outright in 2019, years before any of these bills. That's a documented motive for targeting Austin's climate posture specifically; on the evidence gathered so far, it is not a documented link to any one bill's authorship or lobbying record.

Source: Texas Public Policy Foundation, Aug 14, 2019; Energy and Policy Institute funder tracking →
09

The industry's failures, and who ends up paying for them

This isn't only a story about cold weather breaking equipment — it's a story about what happened after each failure. Gas producers and pipeline operators have escaped the kind of mandatory accountability imposed on power generators, in 2011 and again after 2021, even though FERC and NERC's own final report on Uri found 75.6% of unplanned generator outages traced to freezing (44.2%) and fuel problems (31.4%) combined — gas-fired units were 58% of all failed generators, and 87% of the fuel-related failures were gas production and processing problems, not the power plants themselves. In several documented cases, the same companies whose supply failures helped cause the blackout were the ones profiting most from the prices that blackout produced.

Texans are paying for that failure twice over: once in the blackout itself, and again in the debt taken on to cover it. Gas producers, meanwhile, largely avoided both the costs and the mandatory fix — not because the technology to prevent it didn't exist, but because the law written afterward gave them a way out that power generators didn't get. Austin Energy's own fleet stayed out of this failure record — its plants ran through Uri, and the utility profited from it — which only sharpens the point: this is an industry-conduct problem, not an argument that gas itself can't run in cold weather.

1989 and 2011 — warned twice, fixed voluntarily

In February 2011, 26 Texas power generators failed in a cold-weather event — largely the same units, per the joint FERC/NERC federal report, that had already failed in a 1989 freeze. The report's own finding: “Generators were not required to institute cold weather preparedness, and efforts in that regard lapsed with the passage of time.” The state law that followed, authored by then-Sen. Glenn Hegar, required generators only to file weatherization reports — not to actually weatherize. Hegar himself later told reporters “it's clear the law didn't go far enough.”

Source: WFAA investigation; FERC/NERC joint report on the Feb. 2011 event; KXAN, “Winter preparedness not mandatory… despite 2011 report” →
The 2021 windfall — $11.1 billion, while output was already falling

Gas sellers made an estimated $11.1 billion during the five days of Winter Storm Uri, $8.1 billion of it from power-generation prices that spiked to roughly 75 times normal. Permian Basin producers had already cut output before the first power cuts even began — more than half of the production decline happened before Feb. 15 — worsening the very shortage that drove those prices. San Antonio's public utility CEO called it “egregious natural price gouging.” No producer faced a penalty for the output cuts or the contract cancellations that followed; Energy Transfer posted a quarterly net income more than triple its previous best.

Source: Fortune, Jul 2021, citing Wood Mackenzie and company earnings filings →
The loophole lawmakers wrote into their own fix

SB3 (2021) only requires weatherization for gas facilities that voluntarily declare themselves “critical infrastructure” — an opt-out power generators don't get. Senators who'd voted for the bill later grilled the Railroad Commission over their own loophole; Sen. Robert Nichols asked the agency's director, “Wait a minute… You haven't done it yet?” The Texas Oil and Gas Association had lobbied against a mandatory requirement, arguing producers might “shut in wells rather than pay to prepare them.”

Source: Texas Tribune, Sept 28, 2021; Texas Monthly, “Natural Gas Producers Are Getting a Pass” →
Weak enforcement made the loophole durable

An E&E News investigation found the Railroad Commission had cited just 222 of more than 7,000 critical gas facilities for anything, with all but 10 of those citations for missed paperwork — zero for actual equipment failures like bad insulation or valves — and total penalties of $30,500. A Texas State Auditor's Office report in August 2025 found the Commission still largely lets gas companies self-certify their own weatherization, citing only 2 of 8,732 inspections across two winter seasons.

Source: E&E News investigation; Texas State Auditor's Office, Aug 2025 →
Customers pay twice — the blackout, then decades of debt

Texas ratepayers are on the hook for at least $10.1 billion in Uri-related debt statewide — bonds and market-withheld funds repaid through bill surcharges running as long as 30 years, to 2049 in one case. Gas utility customers alone are covering $3.5 billion of Uri-related costs through securitized bonds on their bills through 2039, about $4.29 a month for an average residential customer — sixteen years of surcharges for a storm the producers themselves profited from.

Source: Forbes, Aug 2022; Atmos Cities Steering Committee, gas utility securitization tracking →
Austin Energy's own fleet held up — this is about the industry, not Austin's plants

This film is precise about that distinction: Austin Energy's plants “kept chugging along” through Uri, per KUT, and the utility profited by selling power at premium rates during the crisis, even as Austin households faced mandated rolling outages under ERCOT's statewide order. The pattern here isn't that Austin Energy's equipment fails in the cold — it's that the fuel supply chain it depends on for any new gas commitment sits inside an industry with a documented history of profiting from its own shortages and avoiding the fix afterward.

Source: KUT, May 2026 →

What we still don't know

  • Some of the most important numbers in this story aren't settled yet, and this film says so plainly rather than imply otherwise.
  • Austin Energy hasn't disclosed, in anything found so far, whether its battery contracts cap how many times per year those batteries can be charged and discharged — a limit that would change their economics substantially, one way or another.
  • A claim mentioned at a recent utility oversight meeting, that the first Austin Energy battery contract won't be running until 2028, hasn't been independently confirmed in the record checked.
  • Estimates of how long it takes to build a new gas plant vary widely — from roughly three years in some accounts to five or six in others — even as data centers reportedly bring new gas generation online much faster.
  • None of the economic modeling behind this film, for the peaker or for batteries, accounts for how fast Austin's electricity demand will grow — every number here comes from replaying what already happened, not projecting what's coming.
  • Two real, opposite forces are both underway right now: Texas grid forecasters are projecting a large jump in future demand, driven largely by data centers, while a wave of new gas plants — helped along by a state financing program — is already lined up to be built. Which force matters more, and sooner, is genuinely unresolved.

What this points toward

These threads aren't separate complaints. They're one story: how a public utility makes a very large, very long decision under time pressure, with a thin bench in the seat meant to own it, through the venues least built for scrutiny, without finishing the comparison it promised to run — and lands, again, on the same part of the city.

Told fairly, that story doesn't need a villain to matter. What would look different next time is concrete and constructive: a fully staffed, resourced resource-planning function; decisions this size going through open session with current modeling attached; a genuine, finished side-by-side of every real alternative before a 30-year commitment is signed; and a siting process that doesn't default, once again, to the same neighborhoods.

That's the film's actual argument — not that anyone here is a bad actor, but that the process has a track record, this deal fits it, and Austin can choose to do the next one differently.